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This brief has been funded by the Economic and Social Research Council’s UK in a Changing 
Europe programme, which highlights the major challenges and opportunities of Brexit across the 
UK. It is based on interviews and workshops with a range of stakeholders1 in February 2018 on the 
options available for future UK environmental governance, as well as the growing body of 
parliamentary evidence, academic publications and think tank reports on these issues.  
 
 
 
  
                                               
1 Workshop stakeholders included representatives from local and devolved government, public agencies, and 
environmental NGOs. 
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Executive Summary 
The European Union (EU) has had a profound effect on UK environmental policy and 
governance. The EU provides treaty-based principles to underpin and inform new policy 
development and a well-developed system of monitoring and enforcement to ensure it is 
implemented. The EU’s system of environmental governance provides a set of structures that 
establishes minimum common standards across the UK. These structures have allowed the 
devolved nations to develop their own policies, some with a higher level of ambition than the 
UK’s.  EU membership, therefore, provides a common framework that enables both 
transboundary cooperation and local policy innovation.  
Brexit consequently represents a major change to environmental governance in the United 
Kingdom (UK), raising significant opportunities and challenges. Environmental policy in the 
UK is devolved, but UK devolution is asymmetrical: England has no formal representation or 
parliament. For environmental policy this means that the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (Defra) often acts on behalf of England. This model of devolution raises 
concerns amongst stakeholders in the devolved nations that Defra approaches policy with an 
English mind-set, which suggests that English interests will dominate after Brexit. There are 
also concerns that Brexit will lead to greater instability and weaken environmental 
protections. 
In addition, Brexit has prompted a constitutional dispute between the Scottish and UK 
governments, which may jeopardise future environmental governance. These tensions have 
created uncertainty, making Brexit preparations highly challenging for both government and 
civil society actors. Crucially, the key planks of the UK government’s ‘Green Brexit’ strategy—
the 25 Year Environment Plan (25 YEP) and Defra’s consultation on environmental governance 
and principles—do not cover governance in the devolved nations. This gap in coverage raises 
the prospect of policy divergence and inconsistent implementation and enforcement across 
the UK.  More importantly, there is a strong fear in Scotland and Wales that their 
environmental policy ambitions could be thwarted by Brexit and deregulatory pressures 
emanating from England. 
Meanwhile Northern Ireland, which has a history of weak environmental governance and sits 
alongside the politically sensitive border with Ireland, has no government and therefore no 
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voice in the Brexit negotiations. As a result, it is poorly represented in the discussions over 
the future shape of UK-wide environmental policy and governance.   
Key Points 
x There are many incentives for the governments of the devolved nations and the UK 
government to cooperate on environmental policy in ways that allow Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland to develop policies sensitive to local conditions whilst 
cooperating on areas of shared concern. 
x However, the limited trust between the devolved nations and the UK government may 
jeopardise the future development of environmental governance structures after 
Brexit. 
x The lack of a Northern Irish government voice in discussions about a post-Brexit 
environmental settlement raises the risk that policies and structures may not suit the 
Northern Irish context. 
x The current machinery for coordinating policy (the Joint Ministerial Committee) is not 
fit for purpose and should be reformed. 
x New environmental governance structures (including new national watchdogs) should 
be coordinated across the nations of the UK and be transparent and accountable to 
their respective legislatures and citizens. 
x Environmental policy should be properly resourced to enable the development of new 
policies and the implementation and enforcement of existing policies. 
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1. Introduction
The most effective environmental policy facilitates transnational cooperation to deal with 
transboundary and shared environmental problems, while simultaneously remaining sensitive 
to local conditions and circumstances. Public awareness and participation have long been 
regarded as essential ingredients of good environmental policy-making. Citizens need to feel 
a sense of ownership of environmental goals if they are to act to protect the environment, 
and it is often through citizenship engagement that environmental problems are brought to 
the attention of policy-makers and the wider public. 
These features mean that in order to be effective, post-Brexit environmental policy must 
enable the UK government and the devolved administrations to engage in 
international/regional environmental cooperation, and to coordinate their own policies whilst 
using local knowledge to create enforceable environmental policies that are transparent and 
accountable to citizens. There is also increasing interest in designing policies around 
landscape features (such as water catchments), which do not respect political boundaries 
such as national borders. Hence transnational intra-UK cooperation, communication and 
coordination are essential for environmental protection.     
Membership of the European Union (EU) has profoundly shaped environmental policy and 
governance across the UK.2 Environmental policy is a devolved matter and the ways in which 
powers will be exercised after Brexit have become the focus of a mounting constitutional 
dispute. The EU Withdrawal Act (EUWA) states that powers that are currently exercised at the 
EU level should generally be repatriated to the devolved administrations but gives the UK 
government the ability to restrict their policy-making authority in areas where common UK-
wide frameworks are determined to be necessary.3 
The Scottish government has adopted a Scottish Continuity Bill, which is subject to legal 
challenge in the Supreme Court, with a ruling expected in Autumn 2018.4 The Scottish 
position on environmental policy is that Scotland has been and wishes to continue to be a 
                                               
2 Burns, C., Jordan, A. and Gravey, V., 2016. The EU referendum and the UK environment: the future under a 
‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ Brexit.   
3 HM Government, 2018. European Union (Withdrawal) Act, Clauses 10-12. For further information, see: House 
of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2018. Devolution and Exiting the 
UK: reconciling differences and building strong relationships, especially paragraphs 48-50.  
4 Scottish Government, 2018. UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill. 
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global environmental leader.5 Both for these reasons and to retain access to the EU’s single 
market6 the Scottish government has committed to maintain and improve EU standards, to 
continue to align with EU environmental policy and to implement EU environmental policy 
principles.7 However, the Scottish government cannot move forward with its Brexit plans 
until the Supreme Court has ruled on the Continuity Bill, which means that the UK and 
Scottish governments’ timelines for action are not synchronised. 
By contrast, the National Assembly for Wales has given its consent to the EU Withdrawal Act, 
which contains an explicit requirement for the government to bring forward legislation on 
environmental principles and lists those principles that should be included (see Table 1). 
However, because environmental policy is a reserved power, the requirements in the EUWA 
on environmental principles do not apply to Wales. However, the Welsh government has 
committed to non-regression on environmental principles and standards, and to continuing 
to improve upon EU standards. It has also committed to enshrining key environmental 
principles in legislation, but there is scope for the UK and Welsh governments to commit to 
different principles and to interpret them in different ways. 
Northern Ireland has long lagged behind the rest of the UK (and indeed the rest of the EU) in 
the quality of its environmental governance. It also faces distinct cross-border and all-island 
environmental challenges that it shares with Ireland – such as how to tackle pollution or 
invasive species that affect both jurisdictions. 
At UK level, the government has adopted a 25 Year Environment Plan (25 YEP) and issued a 
consultation on environmental principles and governance with a bill expected anytime from 
Autumn 2018 onwards.8 This bill will be limited to England, although the consultations 
suggest that co-designed policies or approaches may be developed. However, it is unclear 
how such co-design will work in practice. There is a suspicion amongst stakeholders in the 
devolved administrations that co-design simply means Defra deciding its position and then 
informing them of the outcome, with limited opportunity for genuine input.  
Consequently, determining the immediate contours of the post-Brexit environmental 
settlement is difficult, let alone its longer-term future. The UK is composed of countries with 
distinct histories and traditions that hold complementary yet diverging preferences on 
                                               
5 Scottish Government, 2018. Developing an environment strategy for Scotland: discussion paper. 
6 Scottish Government, 2018. Scotland's place in Europe: people, jobs and investment. 
7 Scottish Government, 2018. Developing an environment strategy for Scotland: discussion paper. 
8 HM Government, 2018. A green future: Our 25 year plan to improve the environment; Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2018. Environmental principles and governance after EU Exit. 
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environmental policy and which are operating on different timelines against a background of 
constitutional conflict.  
This context of deep uncertainty raises the risk that the environment will be downgraded on 
the policy agenda. Brexit presents an opportunity to reform and improve UK environmental 
policy ambition, coherence, and coordination to deliver well-designed policy that is fit for 21st 
century environmental challenges. The 25 YEP, environmental principles and governance 
consultation, the Scottish Environmental Strategy consultation, the Welsh government’s 
Securing Wales Future all demonstrate a desire and willingness to develop and improve 
environmental policy and governance. However, current political and constitutional 
disagreements make it unlikely that the opportunities for reform presented by Brexit will be 
realised.  
A major risk is that the UK government will seek to ‘muddle through’ by making incremental 
adjustments to policies and structures that are already unfit for purpose. Doing so may 
compromise environmental policy ambition across the UK and hence undermine overall 
policy coherence.  
This policy brief draws together the insights of practitioner workshops organised by Brexit & 
Environment under Chatham House rules to discuss the implications of Brexit for 
environmental policy. These workshops were held in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
England, with a specific focus on devolution, a topic which has all too often been overlooked 
in these debates. The views of practitioners from the devolved nations are central to this 
work and we hope we have captured their concerns whilst also developing 
recommendations that offer practical remedies. We identify several core challenges and 
provide ten recommendations for delivering well-coordinated, coherent and effective 
environmental governance after Brexit.  
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2. Brexit, Devolution and 
Environmental Policy 
Devolution in the UK is asymmetrical. England does not have its own representation (instead 
it is governed directly by Westminster). Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland enjoy varying 
degrees of autonomy, but each has responsibilities for the environment, agriculture, fisheries 
and energy. These devolution settlements were created in the context of EU membership, 
and therefore the EU’s minimum standards for environmental protection apply to all parts of 
the UK.9  
Under the environmental guarantee principle, enshrined in Article 193 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, territories within member states can adopt ‘more 
stringent protective measures’ than those stipulated in EU legislation.10 The intersection of 
the devolution settlements with EU membership has allowed for ‘upward divergence’ in 
environmental policy across the four UK nations. In particular, the Scottish and Welsh 
governments have sought to create environmental policies that go beyond the EU’s 
minimum requirements. 
For example, Scotland has more ambitious targets in the areas of climate and energy policy 
and plastic waste and has also generally performed better at implementing some EU 
Directives and going beyond their requirements.11 Wales has sought to create more ambitious 
environmental policies than the UK in relation to climate change and waste.12 Notably, the 
Welsh government has also passed innovative environmental legislation, including the Well-
being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 and the Environment (Wales) Act 2016.13 It has 
re-fashioned environmental governance to develop distinctive institutions by creating a 
                                               
9 Burns, C., Gravey, V., and Jordan, A., 2018. UK environmental policy post-Brexit: A risk analysis. 
10 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 193. 
11 On climate and energy, see: Royles, E. and McEwen, N., 2015. Empowered for action? Capacities and 
constraints in sub-state government climate action in Scotland and Wales. Environmental Politics 24 (6): 
1034-1054; On implementation, see: Reid, C., Burns, C., Carter, N., Cowell, R., Eckersley, P., Farstad, F., Gravey, 
V., Jordan, A and Moore, B., 2018. Scotland: Challenges and opportunities for post-Brexit environmental 
governance.  
12 On climate change, see: Royles, E. and McEwen, N., 2015. Empowered for action? Capacities and 
constraints in sub-state government climate action in Scotland and Wales. Environmental Politics 24 (6): 
1034-1054. On waste, see: Cowell, R., Flynn, A. and Hacking, N, 2017. Assessing the impact of Brexit on the UK 
waste resource management sector. Cardiff University. 
13 Cowell, R., Burns, C., Carter, N., Eckersley, P., Farstad, F., Gravey, V., Jordan, A., Moore, B. and Reid, C., 2018. 
Wales: Challenges and opportunities for post-Brexit environmental governance, p. 8. 
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Future Generations Commissioner for Wales. However, whilst Wales has shown 
environmental leadership ambition in some areas, in others it has performed less well, most 
notably in relation to air quality, where the Welsh government has struggled to meet the 
targets established by EU legislation.14 
The ambitions shown by Wales and Scotland could lead to the conclusion that devolving 
power to subnational authorities always leads to positive outcomes. However, Northern 
Ireland is an outlier with a poor history of environmental governance, which is illustrated by 
the frequency of environmental crimes, such as quarrying or mining taking place without 
proper planning permission or environmental impact assessments, and waste crimes that are 
often cross-border, such as illegal dumping of waste in bogs, rivers and fields. The recent 
Renewable Heat Incentive scandal, which saw the Northern Ireland Executive greatly 
overspend on a badly-designed renewable energy scheme that generously subsidised the 
use of wood pellet burners with few controls, is one of many Northern Irish environmental 
governance scandals.15  
The UK government has included some ambitions in its 25 YEP, which is currently intended to 
apply to England. But the plan has been criticised for providing insufficient detail on planned 
targets and monitoring for England. It is also not clear whether and how these ambitions 
might be coordinated with the other nations of the UK.  
Similarly, whilst it appears that Scotland, Wales and England will commit to similar 
environmental principles, the way in which those principles are interpreted and given force 
may vary (see Table 1).  For example, the Scottish Continuity bill provides for environmental 
principles to be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the EU Treaties and 
jurisprudence. In England, the EUWA requires a longer list of principles to be addressed but 
there is no requirement to interpret them in line with the EU Treaties. As the provisions in the 
EUWA do not apply to the devolved administrations it is uncertain how Wales and Northern 
Ireland will interpret and apply environmental principles.  
Moreover, if Scotland aligns itself strongly with EU environmental policy there is scope for 
greater divergence between Scotland and the rest of the UK. EU policies tend to be written 
and framed with clear targets and expectations backed up by a relatively stringent 
enforcement regime. UK governments, by contrast, have tended to frame legislation with 
                                               
14 See, e.g. ClientEarth, 2018. Welsh Government makes last-ditch application to delay air pollution plan. 
15 BBC, 2017. Renewable Heat Initiative Timeline. 
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flexible wording that is open to interpretation; they have been more open to a consensual 
and negotiated approach to environmental policy-making.16 Hence the 25 YEP has been 
roundly criticised for its failure to include clear measurable targets along the lines of those 
developed at EU level.17 Therefore a key challenge for coordinating future UK environmental 
policy is how to manage the different approaches to policy that may emerge.   
Table 1: Environmental principles, the EUWA and the devolved nations.18 
EU Withdrawal Act Scottish Continuity Bill Welsh Position 
The EUWA requires the UK 
government to bring 
forward legislation on 
principles including at a 
minimum: 
x the precautionary     
principle,   
x preventative action 
principle,  
x pollution at source 
principle,  
x the polluter pays 
principle,  
x sustainable development 
principle, 
x environmental protection 
principle,  
x public access to 
environmental 
information,  
x public participation in 
environmental decision-
making,  
x access to justice in 
relation to environmental 
matters. 
There is no requirement for 
these principles to be 
interpreted in line with the 
EU Treaties. 
The Continuity Bill requires 
that the following principles 
be recognised: 
x Polluter pays principle 
x Preventative action principle 
x Tackling pollution at source 
principle 
These principles are to be 
interpreted in line with EU 
Treaties. 
Article 3 TEU and 191 TFEU 
require the pursuit of a high 
level of environmental 
protection.  
As environmental policy is 
devolved the Welsh 
government is not covered by 
the EUWA’s provisions on 
environmental principles. The 
Welsh government has 
committed to:  
x non-regression on 
environmental principles 
and standards,  
x maintaining and 
continuing to improve 
upon EU standards,  
x enshrining key 
environmental principles 
in legislation.   
However, there is scope for 
divergence. For example, 
whilst the EUWA includes a 
commitment to a sustainable 
development principle it is 
unclear how this principle will 
interact with the sustainable 
development principles to 
which the Welsh government 
has committed in domestic 
legislation. 
                                               
16 Jordan, A., 2004. The United Kingdom: From policy-taking to policy shaping. In: Jordan, A. and Liefferink, D. 
Environmental policy in Europe: The Europeanization of national environmental policy. Routledge, Abingdon, 
pp. 204-223. 
17 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, 2018. The Government’s 25 Year Plan for the 
Environment. Eighth Report of Session 2017–19. HC 803.  
18 The Northern Irish position has yet to articulated. 
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3. Challenges to UK 
Environmental Governance 
and Ambition after Brexit 
Our meetings with stakeholders and wider engagement with the policy process have 
highlighted a range of challenging issues for the future of UK environmental governance.  
1. Different ecological conditions, histories and ambitions. The UK ecosystem is diverse, 
ranging from arable lands in South East England to uplands in England, Scotland and 
Wales. There is variability in income levels, land use planning and commitment to 
environmental policies. Northern Ireland has a difficult history of environmental 
governance, while Wales and Scotland have sought to develop their own ambitious 
environmental policies.     
2. England shares terrestrial borders with Scotland and Wales and marine borders with 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. But environmental issues do not respect such 
national borders. Cooperation and coordination of policy goals and of enforcement 
and monitoring will be necessary. 
3. Scotland wants to retain control for devising and managing environmental policy. 
Wales is prepared to pool environmental governance with the UK government, but its 
position is still uncertain. Northern Ireland has no official position, but stakeholders 
suggested that taking a lead from the UK government might be beneficial given the 
history of weak environmental governance. There is therefore scope for policy 
divergence across the UK underpinned by different ambitions.  
4. There is a fundamental lack of trust between the devolved and UK governments.19 This 
trust deficit presents an obstacle to policy coordination. 
5. There is also a suspicion that Defra (and Westminster-based politicians more 
generally) fail to understand or fully respect devolved competences. Officials in Defra 
seem to forget whether they are ‘wearing’ an English, or UK ‘hat’ and often prescribe 
                                               
19 House of Commons, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2018. Devolution and 
Exiting the UK: Reconciling differences and building strong relationships, pp. 20-21. 
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solutions which, whilst appropriate for England, may not be suited to other parts of 
the UK.20 
These factors have combined to create a challenging policy context within which four key 
issues now need to be addressed: policy co-ordination, trade, governance gaps and 
resources.  
3.1 Policy Co-ordination 
The devolved nations and the UK government meet to discuss and coordinate ‘devolved’ and 
‘reserved’ powers in the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), which was created in 1999.21 The 
JMC is comprised of a set of committees composed of ministers from those governments. It 
is designed to provide central co-ordination of the overall relationship between the UK and 
the devolved nations.  
The Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) brings together representatives from 
conservation bodies of the UK’s four nations.22 This body provides advice and 
recommendations, is charged with establishing common standards across the UK for 
monitoring and researching nature conservation, and analyses the resulting information. Its 
recommendations are then left to be implemented by the competent legislative authorities 
in each country. The UK-wide Committee on Climate Change operates on a similar basis, 
although in relation to devolved matters in Scotland it operates in its distinct capacity as the 
Scottish government’s designated advisory body on climate change.23 
The agencies responsible for helping to implement environmental policy across the UK (the 
Environment Agency, the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency, Natural Resources 
Wales and the Northern Ireland Environment Agency)24  have fora for cooperation but the 
perception of stakeholders is that cooperation is not well developed. There is also a North 
South Ministerial Council set up under the Good Friday Agreement to coordinate all-island 
                                               
20 House of Commons, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2018. Devolution and 
Exiting the UK: Reconciling differences and building strong relationships, pp. 28-29. 
21United Kingdom Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland 
Executive Committee, 2013. Devolution: Memorandum of understanding and supplementary agreements. 
See also: Thimont Jack, M., Owen, J., Paun, A., and J. Kellam, 2018. Devolution after Brexit: Managing the 
environment, agriculture and fisheries. Institute for Government. 
22 Joint Nature Conservation Committee, 2018. About JNCC. 
23 Scottish Government, 2009. Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, sections 24-25. 
24 Northern Ireland does not have an independent environment agency, those functions are carried out by 
Northern Ireland’s Department for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs.  
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cooperation between Northern Ireland and Ireland, which has environmental protection as 
one focus.25 
These policy coordination mechanisms were designed to fit a system in which the nations of 
the UK were tied to common standards decided at the EU level.  They therefore were 
designed to accommodate distinctive policies and approaches in each nation but within a 
common envelope. Brexit has highlighted some key limitations, especially in the operation of 
the JMC.  
JMC meetings are infrequent and irregular.26 In addition, they can only be convened when 
the UK government deems it necessary.27 The JMC on European Negotiations, set up to deal 
with Brexit, has failed to meet on the planned monthly basis, and did not meet for 8 months 
between February and October 2017.28  The lack of regular engagement at the highest level 
has also contributed to a general neglect of devolution issues in the Brexit debate and 
negotiations.29  
The current system of cooperation is bilateral with the devolved administrations dealing 
mostly with the UK government directly; the opportunity for all four UK environmental 
ministers to meet and work together is rare. Similarly, there is no arrangement for joint 
working between the parliaments and assemblies of the UK’s four nations. This issue is 
starting to be addressed with more in-depth working between the four administrations via 
civil service ‘deep dives’ to discuss where common frameworks are necessary and what legal 
form they could take, with fisheries, environment and agriculture being central to these 
exercises. At least 30 ‘deep dive’ exercises had been completed by April 2018, addressing all 
areas in which common legislative frameworks are planned. However, current tensions 
between the Scottish and UK governments have seen them grind to a halt. 
Hence, while the deep dives illustrate greater cooperation on devolved matters, there are on-
going issues with the JMC. In addition, existing arrangements for cooperation related to 
international environmental policy are weak, with little engagement of the devolved nations 
in international negotiations. 
                                               
25 Gravey, V., Burns, C., Carter, N., Cowell, R., Eckersley, P., Farstad, F., Jordan, A., Moore, B. and Reid, C., 2018. 
Northern Ireland: Challenges and opportunities for post-Brexit environmental governance.  
26 See Institute for Government, n.d. Devolution and the Joint Ministerial Committee.   
27 House of Lords European Union Committee, 2017. Brexit: Devolution.   
28 See Institute for Government, n.d.  Devolution and the Joint Ministerial Committee. 
29 Farstad, F., 2017. Green Gove woos environment sector: But what about devolution? Brexit & Environment 
Blog. 
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These issues are exemplified by the UK government’s recent actions in relation to 
environmental policy. As noted above, the UK government has committed itself to a ‘Green 
Brexit’ and pushed ahead with the adoption of a 25 Year Environment Plan and a governance 
and principles consultation to address concerns that Brexit could lead to an environmental 
governance gap and weaker environmental standards.30 However, neither the 25 YEP nor the 
consultation applied to the devolved nations. The way in which UK-wide environmental 
policy will be managed and enforced is still to be decided. 
These moves by the UK government have caused irritation within the devolved nations. The 
UK government has given little notice of its plans and the mode of consultation has been 
more in the style of telling the devolved administrations what the UK government’s plans are, 
with little if any opportunity to comment.  
The JMC has agreed a set of principles (see Box 1) to guide post-Brexit policy.31 It has 
suggested that 142 policy areas will be allocated into three groups:32  
1. Areas where no further action is necessary (covering 49 areas including 9 related to the 
environment such as water quality and land use policy); 
2. Areas that could require new non-legislative arrangements (covering 82 areas 
including 10 related to the environment such as biodiversity and air quality policy); 
3. Areas that may require new common legislative frameworks (24 including 19 related to 
the environment such as chemicals and pesticides policy). 
There are twelve further areas that the UK government believes are reserved but which will 
still be subject to discussion with the devolved nations, including two areas related to the 
environment: eco-design and energy labelling, and environmental regulations on the 
international trade in timber.  
The allocation of policies to these groups has raised a set of concerns. First, it is unclear why 
some policy sectors have been allocated to particular groups. For example, water policy is 
identified as an area where no further action is necessary despite the transboundary 
implications of water use and pollution. There also seems to have been little consideration of 
                                               
30 HM Government, 2018. A green future: Our 25 Year Plan to improve the environment; Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2018. Environmental principles and governance after EU Exit. 
31 HM Government, 2017. Joint Ministerial Committee communique: 16 October 2017.  
32 HM Government, 2018. Frameworks analysis: Breakdown of areas of EU law that intersect with devolved 
competence in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
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how to manage the interaction between policies covered by legislative frameworks (such as 
chemicals) and those which are not covered (such as water).33  
Box 1: Common Frameworks in the Joint Ministerial Council 
Common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to:  
x enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy 
divergence;  
x ensure compliance with international obligations;  
x ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements  
and international treaties;  
x enable the management of common resources;  
x administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element; 
x safeguard the security of the UK.  
JMC Conclusions (16 October 2017)34 
The Environmental Audit Committee noted that whilst there is no indication that current 
administrations would seek to weaken regulation, there is also no guarantee that future 
administrations would not do so.35 Therefore failing to put in place legislative frameworks 
underpinned by a commitment to high standards leaves the environment vulnerable over the 
longer term. 
In 2017, the Welsh government proposed a constitutional convention to develop a UK Council 
of Ministers on the grounds that ‘the current intergovernmental machinery will no longer be 
fit for purpose’ after Brexit.36  The First Minister of Wales has stated that he is happy to accept 
the idea of common frameworks, but he has expressed concern about the process by which 
they are agreed.   
                                               
33 See National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change and Rural Affairs Committee, 2018. Common 
frameworks for the environment after Brexit; Gravey, V. 2018. Written evidence provided to the Welsh 
Assembly Climate Change, Environment and Rural Affairs Committee inquiry into UK common frameworks 
on agriculture and the environment. 
34 HM Government, 2017. Joint Ministerial Committee communique: 16 October 2017. 
35 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, 2018. The Government’s 25 Year Plan for the 
Environment. Eighth Report of Session 2017–19. HC 803.  
36 Welsh Government, 2017. Securing Wales’ future: Transition from the European Union to a new relationship 
with Europe, p.8. 
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For example, the April 2018 inter-governmental agreement between the Welsh and UK 
governments setting out the process for agreeing common frameworks, provides for the UK 
government to draft the common frameworks, and then allows forty days for the devolved 
legislatures to grant consent.37  If consent is withheld, regulations can still be agreed if the UK 
Parliament votes in their favour. As a result, the devolved legislatures only have the right to 
consent to, rather than to amend, proposed common frameworks. They are also afforded 
only forty days to consult with relevant stakeholders. This approach limits the scope for 
legislative and citizen participation, as well as the transparency and accountability of the 
process. 
Conclusion: Environmental policy co-ordination across the nations of the UK will be 
necessary. Current mechanisms are not fit for purpose. They lack transparency and do not 
allow for full involvement of the devolved administrations in decision-making. Decisions on 
where and how legislation may be needed have been taken without public consultation and, 
moreover, seem poorly thought through. 
3.2 Trade 
Brexit raises environmental policy concerns with regard to both internal and international 
trade. 
Internal (intra-UK) trade: The agreement of common frameworks is intended to prevent a 
‘race to the bottom’ in environmental standards between the four nations. If the UK and its 
devolved governments are able to agree a unified position, their combined strength vis-à-vis 
businesses and potential polluters will make it easier to adopt ambitious standards across all 
four nations. However, if standards across the UK differ significantly, polluters may ‘dump’ 
(literally, in the case of solid waste) in the nation that has the least stringent regulations. 
There are therefore practical commercial advantages to having single standards across the 
UK to avoid pollution tourism. 
However, the greater size of the English economy and the greater familiarity with it in 
Whitehall may lead to decisions that fail to take account of the diverse needs of the different 
nations of the UK. The devolved administrations may be reluctant to develop policies that 
differ significantly in ambition from those in England, especially if those policies are 
perceived to impose additional burdens on local industry. For example, after the UK 
                                               
37 UK Government and Welsh Government, 2018. Intergovernmental Agreement on the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill and the establishment of common frameworks. 
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government dropped its policy commitment to ensuring that new homes in England would 
be carbon neutral by 2016, the Welsh government felt compelled to move its regulations in 
the same direction due to pressures from major housebuilders.38   
International trade: Negotiations of international trade agreements are reserved to the UK 
government, but such agreements can significantly impinge upon the devolved nations’ 
policy objectives and competencies (see Box 2). 
Box 2: International Trade and Genetically Modified Organisms 
The issue of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) illustrates the intersection of 
devolved competences with those matters reserved to the UK government, such as 
international trade. Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have adopted more restrictive 
policies on GMOs than England in line with the EU Deliberate Release Directive. This 
divergence between the devolved administrations and England on the cultivation of 
GMOs has implications for intra-UK and international trade. For the UK government, 
ensuring harmonisation and the absence of barriers to trade within the UK internal 
market is crucial. Divergence in standards may restrict such trade. Moreover, as the UK 
government is responsible for negotiating future trade agreements, there is scope for it 
to reach a deal with pro-GMO states such as Brazil, Argentina and the US that 
undermines the policy preferences of the devolved nations. Consequently, this is an 
issue area where there is scope for policy conflict in future.39  
To date the operation of existing coordination mechanisms has not facilitated meaningful 
involvement of the devolved nations in international trade negotiations.  
Future trade agreements may lead to competitive deregulatory pressure if products that 
have been subject to lower standards enter the UK market. The EU and UK have both 
committed in principle to the inclusion of an environmental non-regression principle in any 
                                               
38 National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change, Environment and Rural Affairs Committee, 2018. Low 
carbon housing: the challenge.   
39 See Petetin, L., 2018. GMO cultivation in the UK: Brexit, the devolved administrations and international 
trade. Brexit & Environment Blog.  
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future trade agreement.40 However, that agreement has yet to be negotiated and these 
commitments will become moot in the event of a no-deal outcome.41   
Conclusion: There is a risk of deregulatory pressures arising from new trade agreements or 
from differential standards adopted across the UK market. There is scope for environmental 
ambitions within the devolved nations to be undercut by: 
1. A failure to coordinate trade policies in a way that respects these environmental 
ambitions;  
and/or  
2. A post-Brexit trade deal that undercuts domestic standards.  
3.3 Governance Gaps 
New institutions will be required for environmental policy development, implementation and 
enforcement after Brexit. Policy formulation has largely been centred on Brussels where the 
European Commission develops policy in the Directorate-General for the Environment and 
Directorate-General for Climate Action. After Brexit, this power will in principle rest within 
the UK. In practice, it is likely to be dispersed across the devolved nations subject to 
agreement about joint frameworks and the UK Supreme Court ruling on Scotland’s Continuity 
Bill. 
The UK contributes to and benefits from membership of the European Environment Agency 
(EEA), which gathers comparable cross-national data to inform EU and national policy 
development and implementation. Whilst the UK government has expressed a preference to 
participate in some EU agencies after Brexit, it has not included the EEA in that list.42 There is 
consequently the risk of uncertainty about whether and how the UK will gather and access 
environmental data. The Scottish government has proposed setting up a series of knowledge 
accounts to ensure that the best available data are used to inform Scottish environmental 
policy development.43 The UK government has made no such commitment. There is 
consequently scope for different types of data being used to inform policy development and 
                                               
40 For the EU, see: Barnier, M., 2018. Is Brexit a threat to the future of the EU's environment? Speech given to 
the European Parliament, 10 April 2018; For the UK, see: HM Government, 2018. The future relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union, p.38. 
41 UK in a Changing Europe, 2017. Cost of no deal, p. 16; UK in a Changing Europe, 2018. Cost of no deal 
revisited, p. 29. 
42 HM Government, 2018. The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, pp. 
8-10. 
43 Scottish Government, 2018. Developing an environment strategy for Scotland: Discussion paper, p. 9. 
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implementation across the UK. Such divergence may have implications for citizens wishing to 
access environmental data under the terms of the Aarhus Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters.44 It may also affect the way the different nations measure performance, raising the 
risk of further divergence and potential conflict in the future over environmental damage. 
EU institutions such as the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) provide ways to hold member state and devolved governments to account and to 
settle environmental disputes (see Box 3). For example, between 2003 and 2016 the 
Commission brought 29 cases against the UK on environmental matters, 24 of which resulted 
in a judgment wholly or partly against the UK government. Notably, these cases represent 
almost half of all the Court’s judgments on UK infringements, thereby illustrating the 
importance of such legal mechanisms for enforcing environmental policy.45 Once the UK 
leaves the EU it will need to develop its own mechanisms to hold government to account and 
to resolve problems around the interpretation of common frameworks.46 Defra’s governance 
and principles consultation suggests a new watchdog but the current proposals have been 
widely criticised for being too weak.47 They also do not apply to the UK, but rather to England 
alone; the way in which the body will coordinate with the devolved nations is still highly 
uncertain. There is scope for the new body to work with equivalent bodies in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, but it is uncertain which bodies will assume monitoring and 
enforcement powers.   
The Future Generations Commissioner in Wales does not currently have the power to take on 
a watchdog role, and National Resources Wales is not independent from Government, so 
both appear to have been discounted.48 Consequently, the Welsh government’s plans in 
relation to a watchdog are still under development.  
                                               
44 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, n.d. Public Participation. 
45 Hogarth, R. and Lloyd, L., 2017. Who’s afraid of the ECJ?  Charting the UK’s relationship with the European 
Court. Institute for Government. 
46 Lee, M., 2017. The UK needs a new independent body to protect the environment after Brexit. Brexit & 
Environment Blog. 
47 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, 2018. The Government’s 25 Year Plan for the 
Environment. Eighth Report of Session 2017–19. HC 803. 
48 National Assembly for Wales, Climate Change, Environment and Rural Affairs Committee, 2018. 
Environmental governance arrangements and environmental principles post-Brexit. 
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Box 3: Enforcing Environmental Law—The Challenge of Air Quality 
Air quality is a devolved issue and meeting EU targets has been a challenging across the 
UK, but the ability of non-governmental organisations to use EU law to pursue the 
government has been critical in pushing UK authorities to take action. For example, the 
UK government has been taken to court three times by the environmental group Client 
Earth over its failure to meet the requirements of the EU Ambient Air Quality Directive.49  
The enforcement mechanisms of the EU have provided the framework that has allowed 
Client Earth to take the government to court. There is concern amongst stakeholders 
that without such a framework the UK would adopt weaker targets.  
Within the UK, Scotland has taken a leadership position on this issue. In 2016, it moved to 
become the first country in Europe to adopt the World Health Organization’s 
recommended guideline value for PM 2.5.50 In contrast, in 2017 it became apparent that 
the Welsh government had failed to put in place appropriate measures to reduce air 
pollution in line with the requirements of the EU Ambient Air Quality Directive. Following 
legal action, the Welsh government agreed to introduce a new air quality plan by the end 
of July 2018.51 This deadline has now been missed. The High Court has granted an 
extension until 30 November 2018 for the Welsh government to introduce its plan. 
 
The air quality case demonstrates the scope for divergence in performance even when 
there are common rules, and the importance of access to legal redress to hold 
governments to account and to ensure that poor policy implementation is addressed. 
Scotland has established an expert roundtable to offer advice on the impacts of Brexit on the 
environment and climate change.52 The Scottish Continuity Bill also requires the government 
to prepare and consult on proposals for new legislation. However, the timetable for 
developing a new English and possibly Scottish watchdog is not aligned.  
There is a strong case for an independent environment watchdog in Northern Ireland as there 
is no independent Environment Agency (the Northern Irish Environment Agency sits within 
                                               
49 Client Earth, 2018. Government loses third air pollution case: Judge rules air pollution plans unlawful.  
50 O’Brien, F., 2016. Air quality in Scotland. SPiCE Briefing. 
51 Client Earth, 2018. Wales concedes but UK Government contests air pollution case.  
52 See Scottish Government, Roundtable on Environment and Climate Change, 2018. Environmental 
governance in Scotland after Brexit: Assessment and options for consideration report.  
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the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs [DAERA]). However, because 
there is no Northern Irish government and the UK government has not instituted direct rule, 
any discussion on future watchdogs is taking place behind the scenes with little public 
involvement.  
The lack of clarity on how environmental watchdogs will operate, and the different timelines 
and processes to create enforcement mechanisms across the four nations of the UK, creates 
risks of governance gaps for environmental policy. These risks would be especially serious in 
the case of a ‘no deal’ Brexit. In that scenario, it is possible that the UK could leave with EU 
environmental legislation in place (via the EUWA), but without the monitoring and 
enforcement powers of the European Commission and the CJEU.53 
There are on-going discussions on future dispute resolution mechanisms across the four 
nations. Disputes are currently decided via the JMC, but as noted above it is regarded as 
being unfit for purpose. Moreover, there may be a case for a specialist environmental dispute 
resolution mechanism to provide policy-specific expertise.54   
It is unclear whether and to what extent members of the public and civil society 
organisations will be able to use such bodies to secure the implementation and enforcement 
of environmental policy in line with international law obligations under the Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters.55 The UK’s current performance is poor: in 2017, the UK was 
found to be in breach of its Aarhus obligations due to the high cost of judicial reviews. There 
is an opportunity to address these failings in developing a watchdog that is transparent and 
accountable. 
However, it also remains to be decided how any new body would be held to account. There is 
a strong presumption in favour of parliamentary accountability. The question then arises as to 
which legislatures should be involved.  
If a UK-wide watchdog is developed there is a case for the UK Parliament holding the body to 
account. The Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) has proposed establishing a new 
Environmental Enforcement and Audit Office that would report to the Parliament and have 
                                               
53 Greener UK, 2018. What would a no deal Brexit mean for the environment? p. 4. 
54 Thimont Jack, M., Owen, J., Paun, A., and J. Kellam, 2018. Devolution after Brexit: Managing the 
environment, agriculture and fisheries. Institute for Government. 
55 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, n.d. Public Participation. 
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its budget set by a statutory group of Parliamentarians to ensure its independence.56 Whilst 
the EAC proposals are for an England-only body they could be extended to a UK-wide 
watchdog.  However, there should be a mechanism for devolved legislatures to be involved 
so as not to encroach upon devolved competences.  
If a series of four watchdogs is developed, there is a case for an approach where each 
legislature holds each watchdog to account. If a mixed (4+1) system is adopted with four 
watchdogs for England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the UK as a whole, both levels 
could be included. Hence, a cross-national committee comprising representatives from each 
of the four legislatures could also be used to review and hold to account either a UK-wide 
watchdog with cross-national powers or a group of watchdogs.  
Conclusion: New institutions and coordination will be required for policy development, 
monitoring and enforcement. Important decisions are urgently required on data collection 
and coordination of enforcement functions and accountability mechanisms. New governance 
bodies should be subject to legislative oversight from all relevant parliaments and 
assemblies.  
3.4 Resources 
The National Audit Office ranks Defra second in the list of Whitehall departments most 
affected by Brexit. It must create new fisheries and agriculture policies as well as put in place 
151 statutory instruments required by the EUWA before the end of March 2019.57 Over 1,300 
new staff members have been recruited to Defra to help pave the way to an orderly Brexit.58  
The issues of resources and staffing are also important for the devolved nations both in 
preparing for Brexit and in managing the immediate aftermath. The Scottish government has 
registered its objection that the funds, which have been released to enable the civil service to 
prepare for Brexit, have not been distributed to the devolved administrations in line with the 
Barnett formula, which is used for allocating resources within the UK.59  
                                               
56 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, 2018. The Government’s 25 Year Plan for the 
Environment, pp.3-4. 
57 National Audit Office, 2017.  Implementing the UK’s exit from the European Union: The Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; National Audit Office, 2018. Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs: Progress in implementing EU Exit. 
58 National Audit Office, 2018. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: Progress in implementing 
EU Exit. 
59 Gourtsoyan, P., 2018. SNP accuses Westminster of short-changing Scotland over Brexit fund. The 
Scotsman, 13 March. 
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Brexit also follows a long period of austerity and significant staffing cuts.  For example, the 
Scottish government has already seen reduced capacity as a consequence of budgetary 
constraints: the budget it received from Westminster fell by 7.4% between 2010/11 and 
2017/18.60  Moreover, the Barnett formula is based on population share rather than need, 
which is the main criterion used for distributing EU funds. Hence, the Welsh government is 
currently a net beneficiary of EU funding and receives more from the EU than it would under 
the Barnett formula. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Welsh government has called for a new 
formula for distributing funds after Brexit based on need rather than population share.   
In Northern Ireland, DAERA had also seen its staff cut in recent years, which has limited the 
number of staff members available to deal with Brexit. In spring 2018 there were 1,200 staff 
working on Brexit in Defra, compared to just thirty in DAERA. Although staff numbers for 
Brexit preparation are increasing through the application of the Barnett formula, Northern 
Ireland will remain a small administration faced with a growing number of responsibilities.61  
Overall, there is a risk of fewer resources being available for environmental policy in the 
devolved administrations. On-going uncertainty about funding also compromises the ability 
of key stakeholders (such as farmers and landowners) to make decisions. 
Moreover, Brexit has tight timeframes, with the government setting a deadline of 29 March 
2019 for the UK to leave the EU and the EU suggesting that any transition period should end 
in December 2020. It will be difficult to develop the necessary administrative and governance 
capacity in such a short space of time.  
The ‘opportunity costs’ of Brexit, such as the resources (staff, money and time) that will be 
necessary to undertake the administrative challenge of carrying it out, are also 
considerable.62 There is a risk that Brexit is currently and will continue to occupy so much civil 
service time and energy across the UK that neither the UK government nor the devolved 
administrations will be able to advance ambitious environmental protections. Moreover, new 
bodies to coordinate policy and ensure comparability of enforcement will also require 
resourcing. Here it is important to ensure that the resourcing models adopted for the new 
bodies do not compromise their independence.  
                                               
60 Scottish Government, 2017. Scottish Budget: Draft Budget 2017-18, pp. 3-4. 
61 Gravey, V., Burns, C., Carter, N., Cowell, R., Eckersley, P., Farstad, F., Jordan, A., Moore, B. and Reid, C., 2018. 
Northern Ireland: Challenges and opportunities for post-Brexit environmental governance. 
62 National Audit Office, 2017.  Implementing the UK’s exit from the European Union: The Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.  
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Conclusion: A Green Brexit cannot be delivered without adequate resources. Brexit raises the 
risk that with the loss of pooled capacity at the EU level and a further squeeze on devolved 
public finances, environmental policy will be subject to spending cuts and other resource 
constraints.  
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4. Future Directions  
Brexit offers an opportunity to re-think the design and future ambition of environmental 
policy in the UK. The Scottish, Welsh and UK governments have indicated a willingness and 
ability to think strategically about how to deliver environmental policy that respects local 
conditions whilst meeting global environmental challenges. However, the way that Brexit has 
unfolded has obscured the common environmental ambitions that unite them and 
heightened the risk that the environment will be downgraded on the policy agenda. There is 
also a strong risk that without a voice in current discussions Northern Ireland will be forced to 
adopt whatever is agreed, regardless of whether it works in the Northern Irish context. 
We found a range of challenges that could obstruct UK environmental policy ambition. We 
suggested in the introduction that the best environmental policy is one that facilitates 
transnational action whilst remaining sensitive to local conditions. Environmental policy 
works best where policy-makers can take account of local conditions and allow local 
communities to get involved whilst also facilitating cooperation and coordination on 
transboundary problems. Thinking at a landscape scale requires thinking across political 
boundaries and borders. Developing well-integrated policies has commercial as well as 
environmental benefits. We also suggested that policy must be transparent and accountable, 
allowing for citizen involvement and be based upon effective communication, cooperation 
and coordination. 
The current model of UK environmental governance falls short on all counts and the 
opportunity to address these flaws in developing a post-Brexit environmental settlement has 
yet to be embraced. We propose the following recommendations to address these 
challenges. 
4.1 Recommendations 
1. As a matter of priority, the devolved administrations and UK government should reach 
agreement on how to align their respective environmental policy ambitions in ways 
that respect the environment and facilitate intra-UK commerce. Such an agreement 
should be genuinely co-designed.   
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2. The UK government and devolved administration should commit to delivering a high 
level of environmental protection. Common agreement on environmental policy 
principles and their interpretation must be negotiated. 
3. Common frameworks must be agreed and there should be a presumption in favour of 
transparent legislative frameworks underpinned by common standards and principles 
to avoid gaps in implementation and to create the conditions for successful policy 
coordination and cooperation.   
4. The Joint Ministerial Council is unfit for purpose and should be reformed to allow parity 
for the devolved nations. Sufficient notice should be given of policy developments and 
the process should be genuinely consultative.  
5. Scotland has a different legal system from the rest of the UK and has expressed a 
preference to align with the EU. There is therefore a case for Scotland either to have its 
own environmental watchdog or to empower an existing set of institutions to perform 
this role.  Having a Scottish environmental watchdog could foster a deeper sense of 
ownership of environmental policy.  
6. As the Welsh and Northern Irish position on environmental watchdogs is undecided, 
one possibility is that two bodies could be developed: one to cover England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland and a separate one covering Scotland. 
7. Co-operation and coordination between a Scottish body and its equivalents in England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland will be essential. There is a strong case for a UK-wide 
coordinating body, such that a 4+1 model is adopted, which combines watchdogs 
within each nation of the UK with a UK-wide oversight committee.    
8. The new watchdog(s) must be independent, transparent and accountable and provide 
access to citizens and be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and accountability.  
9. A dispute resolution mechanism should be established to manage any environmental 
disputes between the nations of the UK. Citizens that have suffered negative 
environmental consequences from policies in one of the other nations of the UK should 
be able to raise environmental issues with the watchdog in that state and vice versa.  
10. Environmental policy must be properly resourced to enable the development of new 
policies and the implementation and enforcement of existing policies. 
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